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The Henry Simons Lectures
The Law School recently inaugurated a new bien­
nial lecture series, the Henry Simons Lectures. This
series has been established in recognition of the con­
tributions of Henry Calvert Simons (1899-1946) to
Political Economy, and as Professor of Economics in
the Law School from 1938 to 1946. Professor Simons'
essays are collected in Economic Policy for a Free
Society, University of Chicago Press, 1948. His major
work in the field of taxation is contained in two books
published by the University of Chicago Press: Per­
sonal Income Taxation, 1938; Federal Tax Reform,
1950.
The first Simons lecture was delivered in February
by George J. Stigler, Professor of Economics, Colum­
bia University. The lecture, entitled "The Goals of
Economic Policy" is to be found in this issue of the
Record. A reception and dinner honoring Professor
Stigler were held at the Quadrangle Club prior to the
lecture.
Nathan Blumberg, Professor Malcolm Sharp, and Dugald
McDougall, JD'37, at the reception for George Stigler.
Students, faculty and guests at dinner before the Stigler
Lecture.
THE HENRY SIMONS LECTURE
The Goals of Economic
Policy
By GEORGE J. STIGLER
Professor of Economics, Columbia University
I prize the privilege of delivering the first of a series
of lectures which will commemorate the work and
character of Henry Calvert Simons. My pleasure is not
in the least diminished by the conviction that he would
have protested at the suggestion of such a series of
lectures-perhaps likening them to the rigid, weathered
structures erected to military heroes, with the lectures
sometimes bearing a sufficient resemblance to the nerv­
ous, edible birds which hover about them.
And in one sense he would, of course, be wholly
right: the real tribute to a scholar is the continued life
of his intellectual work, and no amount of praise
periodically heaped upon dead ideas will warm them
to life. The work of Simons has received this tribute:
it continues to be in the center of a main current of
political economy which he did so much to create,
and today his thought is as relevant and as far-Sighted
as it was in the moment at which it was written. From
this viewpoint, the highest compliment one can pay a
scholar is to quarrel with him or to go beyond him,
and I am absolutely certain that Simons would second
my invitation to future lecturers to exercise the priv­
ilege more freely than I shall.
But in another sense, Simons would have had no
right to protest the establishment of these lectures for
they honor something that belongs to his friends as
much as to him: his character. This wondrously com­
plex man, of exalted integrity, brilliantly witty, ex­
quisite of taste, generous toward others and unreason­
ably demanding of himself-this man we are entitled
to honor, and without permission. I interpret my lec­
ture, not as a tribute-he deserves much better than he
will receive tonight-but as a reminder to the world
that we continue to love our friend.
I shall speak tonight on the proper goals of economic
policy.
Three goals have long dominated economic policy in
this country, and in the Western World. The first and
most ancient goal is the largest possible output of
goods and services. Maximum output has evolved,
under the impact of social events and economic anal­
ysis, into a two-pronged goal:
First, to employ as fully as possible-that is, as fully
as the other goals allow-the resources at the
society's disposal. Unnecessary unemployment of
men and capital should be eliminated.
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Second, to employ these resources as efficiently as
possible. Broadly speaking, no resource should
be used in one place if it would produce more
elsewhere-it should be impossible to reshuffle
resources to achieve more of some goods without
getting less of others.
The second goal is the growth of the economy.
Natural resources should be prospected, capital ac­
cumulated, and new products and technologies dis­
covered. These forward looking activities have for
their common end a steady rise overtime in the level
of income relative to population.
The last primary goal of economic policy is a com­
parative newcomer, still a vague sentiment when maxi­
mum output had been entrenched for centuries. It is
the reduction in income inequality. The goal of
equality, or at least of much reduced inequality, has
become one of the great forces of our times.
These three goals, maximum output, substantial
growth, and minimum inequality of income, have pro­
vided the justifications for every important innovation
in economic policy. Maximum output is the purpose
of our free trade within the United States, the com­
batting of monopoly, and various antidepression meas­
ures. The growth of income is intended to be served
by our various conservation measures, much of public
education, our public land policy, and the current
flirtation of the federal government with basic re­
search. Minimum inequality is the goal of the personal
income tax, agricultural policies, public housing sub­
sidies, unemployment insurance, and a host of other
policies. Of course I simplify when I identify a policy
with only one goal-it is a poor protagonist of an
economic policy who fails to argue that it will serve all
the goals of economic policy, and that it is also wholly
in keeping with the Scriptures.
There are, to be sure, a variety of minor goals of
policy. The desire to eliminate racial discrimination
has led to certain regulations of economic life, and
again, the desire for personal equality of treatment
independent of income has led to other regulations,
such as prohibitions on personal railway rate dis­
crimination. But these goals have had only minor and
sporadic effect upon economic policy.
One need hardly emphasize the obvious fact that
many of the policies we have adopted have ill-served
any of these goals. The farm program was adopted to
help a class of families with low average incomes and
possibly to conserve resources, but quite probably it
has increased income inequality, at least within agri­
culture, and it is extremely doubtful that any useful
conservation of resources has been achieved. The tariff
was presumably designed to increase domestic output,
but economists believe it has never been an effective
policy to this end. There have also been plain raids on
the federal treasury, such as the silver purchase pro-
gram, which have only the most tenuous connection
with the goals of policy. But every society makes mis­
takes in achieving its goals: often it misunderstands
the efficacy of a given policy in reaching a given
goal; and often the announced goals are merely cloaks
worn by particular groups seeking particular ends.
These aberrations and deceptions do not constitute a
contradiction of the primacy of the goals of maximum
output, substantial growth, and decreased income in­
equality.
A question that can be raised with respect to basic
goals is whether they are fully attainable. I would
say that they should not be. An abstract goal gives
direction to economic policy, just as the North Pole
gives direction to a compass, and just as the compass
becomes useless at the magnetic North Pole, so the
goals of policy lose their value as guides once they are
fulfilled. Specific goals, such as so many television sets
or highway miles or dollars of tax receipts, must
usually be realizable, but general goals should not be
fully realizable.
Whether one accepts this position or not, I think it
is fair to say that at the present time the basic goals
are widely believed to be tolerably well fulfilled in the
United States.
Consider income inequality. Few people think that
the progression in the personal income tax is seriously
insufficient and many think it is excessive. Public
sympathy for groups traditionally viewed as disad­
vantaged, in particular labor unions and farmers, is at
low ebb. It would be wrong to say that "under­
privileged classes" has been deleted from the lexicon
of neo-liberalism, but the concern for them has lost
urgency and to some degree has been supplanted by
concern for the peoples with highly developed desires
in underdeveloped economies.
The satisfaction with the productive performance
of the American economy is even more complete. We
feel rich. We believe that on average we are denied
only luxuries over whose absence no one can wax
indignant. It is true that the workingman still has
only a black and white TV set, and his car is several
years old, but so what? Who really cares whether a
farm program, or a river and harbor pork barrel, wastes
a billion dollars, or less than one day's output of the
American economy? Who believes that the rate of
growth of income is seriously inadequate, or that un­
employment of resources in recent years has been
grievously large? Even the critics of the Thirties have
been silenced or turned into flatterers. In as populous
a nation as ours there still exist critics of the productive
performance of the economic system, but they are in
the uncomfortable position of criticizing the form of
a golfer who wins all the tournaments.
This sense of prosperity, I am certain, is a temporary
thing. The postwar growth of consumer real income,
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compared with 1932-45, has been so sudden and so
large that we have not been able to build up new
desires, but they are gradually emerging. That cele­
brated axiom of economics, the insatiability of human
desires, has survived the much greater increases in
real income achieved at earlier times. In another dec­
ade or so we shall be complaining, and with sincere
pain, of the widespread need to satisfy elementary
decencies such as a summer cottage, the electronic
range, the wholly air-conditioned house, and the
family psychiatrist. But for the moment we are well
off.
Not only should the basic goals of economic policy
be unattainable-they should also be part and parcel
of the civilization of a society. Ours are not. Our basic
goals are the same as the basic goals of the Russians.
The Russians also believe in equality of income.
Their fundamental ethical claim, indeed, is that they
will remove all income differences not strictly justifi­
able by social performance and/or need, and in par­
ticular will not allot any part of income to a class of
private owners of the means of production. I would
quarrel violently with their belief that private property
is not a basic institution of economic progress, but
the argument is being settled for many people by the
substantial growth of output of the Russian economy.
'1\1e may also argue that the inequalities of income in
Russia are large, and not so closely related to social
performance as our own inequalities. Important as
these questions are in assessing the extent to which a
society achieves its goals, they seem to raise arguments
over policies rather than over goals.
And the Russians share the goals of maximum out­
put and rapid economic growth. Indeed every society
that is purposive and non-traditional seeks to do
efficiently whatever it seeks to do. The differences
among societies arise with respect to what output they
seek to maximize. In our society the output to be
maximized is chosen primarily by the individual con­
sumers; in the Russian economy the output to be
maximized is chosen primarily by a central, dictatorial
body. Hence, the Russian desired output contains
more munitions and heavy industrial equipment, as a
share of total output, than the American desired out­
put, but this again is a difference in content (of im­
mense importance, to be sure) rather than in goal.
Now, I do not wish to imply that a goal loses validity
because it is shared by an unfriendly person. It does
not seem sensible to abandon Mozart simply because
one encounters a boor who also admires his music.
And to spurn a goal such as maximum output is to
spurn rational behavior.
Nevertheless, the fact that our economic goals are
the same as the Russians' is anomalous: one would
expect two great powers to have carried into their
economic goals some elements of the political philos-
At dinner before George Stigler's Henry Simons Lecture, left to
right, Robert Zener, Editor-in-Chief of the University of Chi­
cago Law Review, Professor Stigler, and Aaron Director, Pro­
fessor of Economics in the Law School, who introduced Pro­
fessor Stigler.
ophies that lead to their antipathy and rivalry. The
fact that our goals and the Russian goals are the same
has also contributed mightily to the failure of Ameri­
can foreign policy-a policy which has no cutting edge
of political philosophy that might attract the leaders
of other countries. We offer the same goals, and differ
chiefly in promising less with respect to their ful­
fillment.
.The reason I wish to propose a somewhat different
set of goals than those we now profess, however, is not
to set ourselves apart from Russia, nor is it to capture
the intellectual leadership of the neutral world-al­
though these are not negligible hopes. Even if the
United States were the only body of land on earth
or in space, we should urgently need to give direction
and emphasis to our economic policies. It is high time
that we set aside the details of managing a comfort­
able dormitory and concern ourselves with the kind
of society we wish to inhabit.
The supreme goal of the Western World is the de­
velopment of the individual: the creation for the in­
dividual of a maximum area of personal freedom, and
with this a corresponding area of personal respon­
sibility. Our very concept of the humane society is
one in which individual man is permitted and incited
to make the utmost of himself. The self-reliant, re­
sponsible, creative citizen-the "cult of individualism"
for every man, if you will-is the very foundation of
democracy, of freedom of speech, of every institution
that recognizes the dignity of man. I view this goal
as an ultimate ethical value; others may wish to reach
it through powerful utilitarian arguments.
It is one thing for a value to have verbal sov­
ereignty; it is quite another for it to permeate the
social system. Individualism has few enemies in the
United States, but its many friends are becoming less
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fervent and its influence upon the course of events
is shrinking at an alarming rate. One would incur
ostracism in our universities if he denied that man
should be free to think what he wishes, but in­
creasingly he is looked upon as a quaint survivor of
ancient times if he believes that man should be master
of his fate, even when he bears the main effects
of his own decisions. The faith in the individual has
been much impaired by a fairly new doctrine, a very
old belief, and the changing structure of society.
The fairly new doctrine is that of environmental
determinism, which we owe to men as diverse as
Godwin and Marx. On an ever-widening scale it is
being argued that social institutions mold the char­
acter of man: that the food and housing, family,
neighborhood, and education of the child have a
decisive influence upon the way he thinks and behaves
as a man. Noone can doubt, in the light of generations
of social research, that this theory contains much truth.
Its thrust is evident: interest is inevitably shifted from
man's exertions to the social environment which to a
considerable degree determines the nature and direc­
tion of these exertions.
The very old belief is that most men are incapable
of conducting their affairs wisely. Only in the nine­
teenth century did this belief temporarily lose its
dominance: at the threshold of the period of universal
education it was widely believed that the vast majority
of the population could be educated to so high a level
of rationality that it could be trusted with the control
of public affairs as well as the proper conduct of per­
sonal affairs.
Now that the great majority of our population re­
ceives at least 12 years of formal education, it is no
longer possible to expect great results-one must ob­
serve them. And on the whole I sense a growing dis­
illusionment, although direct documentation of this
disillusionment is rather difficult to present because
the miracle of education still provides, for too many
intellectuals, the anchor of their democratic faith and
the emblem of their ethical respectability.
If I may judge by my own discipline, however, the
skepticism about the individual is reappearing in ex­
plicit form. The consumer, according to professional
economic literature, is a complaisant fellow, quick to
follow the self-serving mandates of Madison Avenue
or of a long distance call from a stock broker located
just beyond the reach of extradition. This consumer
is commonly given only the virtue of consistency, and
it is not clear whether his choices are treated as well­
ordered because his follies are reflexive, symmetrical,
and transitive, or because if they were not, his indif­
ference curves would intersect.
I suspect that other disciplines are becoming equally
outspoken, but we may document the declining faith
in the individual by something almost as strong as
Herbert Brook, JD'36, and Roscoe T. Steffen, John P. Wilson
Professor of Law, at the reception for Professor Stigler which
preceded his lecture.
words-actions. Most intellectuals are in favor of in­
creasing governmental control over education (com­
pulsory attendance, certification of teachers, control of
curricula and school year, etc.) and of increasing
intervention by state and federal governments in local
governmental control of education. Yet education is
surely the one field in which, if education imparts
either wisdom or logical training, one would most con­
fidently expect that increasing authority be reserved to
the individual and the small political unit.
The last component of the declining faith in the in­
dividual has been the increasing complexity and
mutual dependence of socialrelationships in an urban
industrial society. The effects of an individual's be­
havior upon others become large. A farmer with
deplorable sanitary habits may be an affront to hu­
manity; a similar city dweller is an immediate hazard
to his neighbors. An eccentric or timid pioneer (if this
latter is not a contradiction in terms) bears the main
costs of his deficiencies; a similar entrepreneur can
throw a thousand blameless men out of work (not very
long, however). A man, in short, can be trusted with
hostile Indians, but not with friendly citizens.
I hope that I have sketched with some plausability
the causes of the decline of faith in the unregulated
and unguided individual, for each contains a good
deal of validity. Each has also been much exagger­
ated. No social research has shown that a man's be­
havior is independent of his will, or that in our society
his potentialities of achievement are rigidly set by
his environment. Our trust in education has been a
narrow, academic faith, and we have almost forgotten
that there are such things as non-academic abilities
or that the schoolroom is only one, and not the major,
center of education for life. And if our society is grow­
ing more complex, it is also offering a variety of
opportunities for individual choice quite beyond the
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The SRO sign was out as George Stigler launched the Henry
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dreams of earlier times.
One can nevertheless �oncede much validity to the
main sources of decline of faith in the individual,
and yet not budge one inch from the goal of indi­
vidual freedom. That men are not independent of
their environments does not mean that they should
be denied the opportunity of determining their lives,
and their environments, as far as this is possible. That
education does not turn most men into scholars does
not reduce the value of allowing them to make their
own wise and stupid decisions. That the increasing
interdependence of men calls for a continuing review
of their rights and duties is no reason for assuming
either that no opportunities for new freedom arise
or that conflicts can be settled only by coercion. We
shall wish to revise the particular content of individ­
ual freedom and responsibility as our society, and
as our understanding of our society, change, but
always there is the problem-the transcendental prob­
lem of all liberal societies-of seeking to enlarge the
individual's share in conducting his life. Men are not
mere social animals, to be governed into prosperity or
tranquilized into non-unhappiness.
-Let us return to our traditional goals of economic
policy. Two of them-maximum output and substan­
tial growth - are ethically neutral: they could be
adopted by a nation of gourmets or ascetics or war­
riors, by tyrants or by democrats. What ethical con­
tent they possess has been introduced, almost surrep­
titiously, by defining output as that which is desired
by free men.
We have placed the main burden of direction of
social policy upon the goal of reduced income inequal­
ity, and it cannot bear this burden. It represents,
indeed, quite fairly one element of the basic value
of individualism: humanitarianism, in the form of the
desire to eliminate poverty and its .concomitants such
as malnutrition and untended illness. Much as we
may quarrel among ourselves as to the proper way
in which to eliminate such ugly things, all of us wish
to be rid of them.
For the rest, minimum income inequality has a very
dubious congruence with our basic values. One would
fear for the individual in a society where a small
group of extremely wealthy individuals had the (mo­
nopoly) power to exploit others or the (financial)
power to subvert the political process. Neither threat
is real or potential: we have too many wealthy people
to collude, and too few to exert a directive influence
upon political life. The goal of minimum income
equality has at best an adventitious, and at worst a
perverse, relationship to individual freedom.
The goal of individual freedom does not lead auto­
matically to a cut and dried program of economic
policies. Continuing research will have to go into the
discovery of the meaning of freedom under changing
social conditions and continuing ingenuity of high
order will be required to contrive policies which will
increase this freedom. It would be much more at­
tractive if I could propose immediately a series of
policies which were wholly novel, irritatingly para­
doxical, and-after the smoke of battle had cleared­
irresistibly persuasive, but in good conscience I can­
not.
Precisely because the tradition of individual freedom
has been so fundamental to our political philosophy,
the most obvious corollaries of it are well known, and
these corollaries, like the goal itself, will appear out­
moded to many eyes. Yet the implications of the goal
are not simply a formalized description of life at some
admired date in history: we have never done as much
At the reception for Professor Stigler, left to right: Gordon
Insley, JD'57, a student in the Foreign Law Program, Pro­
fessor James Stauss of Grinnell College, Professor Stanley
Heywood of Coe College, Professor [o Desha Lucas of the
Law School, James Walsh, of Australia, and Robert Carswell
of Northern Ireland, Commonwealth Fellows at the Law School:
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or as well as we could, and today are doing very
poorly.
Consider the policy of competition. This policy has
a basic role in striking down limitations to individual
freedom and challenging individual capabilities, in
better proportioning rewards to efforts. Yet the policy
'is rapidly losing its popular support and its vitality.
On the one hand there is a growing faith-it is no
more than this-that the giant enterprise is the home
of progress; on the other hand, the argument that
monopoly reduces income has little emotional appeal
to a rich nation.
If we place a main value on the individual, how­
ever, there is no justification for our complacency.
Since the War our antitrust policy has drifted into a
spiritless action against the more blatant forms of
conspiracy and monopolization. While the federal
government has been opening up these backlots to
individual freedom, it has quietly been erecting bar­
riers to individual action throughout the prairies of
economic life, with its paternalistic small business
programs and the regulation of competitive industries
such as agriculture, motor trucking, and housing.
Our programs to assist distressed industries collide
directly with the policy of competition, and they seem
to me a clear instance of the abandonment of indi­
vidual freedom not because it is an obstacle to other
goals, but because freedom is not at the front of pol­
icy. Should we, as we almost always do, ease the
problems of these industries by restricting output,
stockpiling it, fixing prices-each a policy serving to
decrease the freedom and responsibility of the indi­
viduals who are in these industries or who wish to
enter them? We can achieve the same humanitarian
purpose by helping individuals to move to more re­
munerative industries and localities by providing
educational facilities, informational services, travel
grants, and other policies designed to widen their
range of alternatives.
When did we last initiate a large federal program
to increase the range of productive activities open to
the individual, or to enlarge the scope for individual
freedom within an area? Recent answers are hard
to come by. The question would be just as difficult
to answer if we addressed it to the heads of state and
local governments, even could we distract them for
a moment from such important work as the licensing
of scores of trades such as yacht salesmen, exacting
oaths from wrestlers that they are not subversive, but
mostly imploring a higher governmental level to take
over their functions.
We now have innumerable policies designed to
protect the consumer, including some that protect him
against low prices. Obviously we should help to pro­
tect him against those forms of fraud which he does
not actively seek out, but should we protect him
George Stigler, speakisig in Breasted Hall.
against unwise behavior? If we prohibit gambling
to preserve him from moral weakness or actuarial
myopia, should we not also supervise his investment
portfolio to keep his uranium holdings down to a pru­
dent level? My complaint against such policies is less
that the wisdom of a course of action is usually debat­
able than that there is nothing admirable about an
involuntary saint.
The policies designed to influence the distribution
of income call for thorough restudy in the light of
the goal of individual freedom. The main objection
to a progressive income taxation beyond that implicit
in the alleviation of poverty is that it imposes differ­
ential penalties on personal efforts that poorly serve
the goal of inciting each individual to do his best.
Almost the only instrumental defense for such a tax is
that large incomes are "unfair." The main possible
meaning of this charge is that large incomes are not
fully earned. When this is true, and the extent of its
truth has received embarrassingly little study, why
do we not deal directly with the institutions which
give rise to large, systematic, and persistent earnings
beyond what the community believes are just?
The inheritance of wealth may be one such insti­
tution. The right to unlimited, or at least very large,
bequest has customarily been defended in terms of
its effects upon the donor, with very little considera­
tion of the possible effects on the donees. It has tra­
ditionally been argued that the donor is led to vast
exertions and to continued thrift. Yet the need for
relatively free bequest to stimulate large efforts is
surely debatable: we find that men also make im­
mense exertions in areas such as politics, the arts, and
the sciences, where the chief legacy of a highly suc­
cessful man to his son is an inferiority complex. On
the other hand the large inheritance of wealth prob­
ably has the effect of reducing the incentives to the
heir to exercise his full capabilities-he has received
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the gold medal at the beginning of the race. Since
there are precious values in the family itself as an
institution, we cannot eliminate all gifts (let alone
intellectual gifts!) and bequests, but it may be advis­
able to tax inheritances (including gifts during life,
but not estates) much more severely than we already
do.
These comments on policies are highly tentative,
but I hope that they are sufficient to indicate that a
thorough-going philosophy of individual freedom and
responsibility would lead to programs that are neither
consistently "radical" nor consistently "conservative"
by our present standards. We do not have such a
thoroughgoing philosophy at present: we have been
content to defend the freedoms of the individual once
or twice a year, when the attack on them is unusually
direct and brutal, and complacently design our pol­
icies in complete neglect of this goal the remainder
of the year. No one has a greater responsibility than
the university community, which is among the chief
beneficiaries of a regime of freedom, for reviving
faith in this goal and for developing its implications
for economic, and in fact for all social policy.
Llewellyn Lecture
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extra income or an avocation or a sop to an idealism
"for which practice leaves no room," nor even one
expression of a richly-living man's desire to ride a two­
or four-horse team. But the price for these conjoint
advances came close to being as great as the gain.
Both the courses and the full-time teachers were con­
centrated on the rules and fields of law, "positive"
law, the rules largely as they stood at the moment,
indeed dominantly the rules "of substance." There
was some reason for this. The rules and fields of our
law were in chaos; they cried for organization. And
one can understand the initial neglect of the crafts if
the school was to provide, reliably, precisely what
apprenticeship did not so provide.
How Chicago Teaches Craftsmanship
Less justifiable and more unfortunate was Joseph
Story's inRuential curriculum at Harvard concentrating
on his straight "private" law, cutting out that whole
perspective and background of philosophy and of
national and international governmental practice
which had laid the foundation of such lawyers as
Hamilton, Kent, Calhoun, Webster and indeed Story's
self. Harvard itself is still laboring on the needed
recapture of what Story butchered out, but like every
first-rate school has long been at that job; the law
school at Chicago, the entry-port by which Adminis­
trative Law and Theory of Legislation came into the
American law school world, was founded with the
objective of such recapture.
It is also difficult to understand why, as the law
schools all over the country became parts of univer­
sities, they so long and persistently shut their eyes to
their duties of the exploration and inculcation of the
principles of craftsmenship. With the waning of
apprenticeship the arts of the legal crafts slipped into
the forgotten or into disrepute; either they were wholly
neglected or they were seen in terms not of deep truths
about man's nature and man's life with his fellowman,
but as matters of shallow and often ignoble artifice and
trickery. Yet the arts of law are not only essential to
any professional work, they are also law's common
ground with those humanities which are a university's
core and pride, and among which law should stand
with the proudest.
When the arts come to be slighted the answer does
not lie in shunting the responsibility, turning for ex­
ample as Columbia just proposed to an entrance test
in writing. The job is instead to develop in the student
rough carpentry and even skill in writing-in legal
writing, which as it ranges from statute and document
through to the brief and the negotiating letter runs the
gamut of all kinds of writing there are, outside of
formal verse. This is not hard to do, nor is it hard, as
one works in the instruction for accuracy and con­
ciseness and simple structure, to press also for life
and style. The brief, for example, and the statute,
provide teaching apparatus unmatched by the arts
college. But the job does take conscious thought, and
some effort.
Theory and Workshop Instruction Go Hand-in-Hand
That thought and that effort Chicago finds time for
on a scale not matched in this country, readily, if at
all. Hand in hand with it go theory and workshop
instruction in such basic crafts as advocacy and coun­
selling-each viewed whole and as a discipline, with
details of substance used as a good case-book uses
cases: to inform discussion and raise questions more
than to purvey information. The reference here is not
alone to the elementary composition which results for
every student from his first year tutorial research. It
is not alone to the counselling experience available in
the school-run legal aid work, but to the sustained
theory-and-practice of such a "course" as "Commercial
Law Practice," not alone to the general moot court
system and competition which is paralleled in many
schools, but to the developed theory which lays the
basis of the workshop "course," "Legal Argument."
Similarly, in the area of legislation, there is not alone
the universal introduction by way of second-year
tutorial work, but the basic theory that underlies each
of the three or more seminars in current legislation.
Three of Chicago curative procedures on the side of
perspective and vision call for particular mention. As
